On the Road to the 22nd Century

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Throughout this book, I have presented an optimistic vision of Argentina's future based on a central geopolitical hypothesis: our country's destiny has always been more dependent on the course of the global system than on our own decisions. We have neither the economic prosperity, nor the military power, nor the demographic weight, nor the key resources, nor the strategic location to be a decisive player in the course of human history. What we do have is a combination of very particular and uncommon characteristics that give us a clear comparative advantage in the complex and turbulent world ahead.

In this early part of the second quarter of the 21st century, Argentina's growing visibility in various geopolitical debates has already begun to emerge, reflecting a growing appreciation of the strategic value of both our country and the Southern Cone. The great unknown arising from this phenomenon is whether this evolution will lead Argentina to end up firmly in the orbit of the hemispheric power, the U.S. Although there is a clear political affinity between Donald Trump and the current Argentine president, Javier Milei, this is a short-term phenomenon within a more enduring process: we see a Washington that, increasingly uncertain of its global hegemony, is seeking key footholds as it attempts a calculated retreat. In this sense, the Southern Cone is a strategic location for securing hemispheric supremacy while it assesses its unresolved conflicts outside the region.

Nevertheless, the multiple domestic and foreign fronts Washington will continue to face in the coming decades pose a significant obstacle to its ability to maintain its undisputed influence in South America: a consolidated China, a turbulent Middle East, a rising India, a rearmed Europe, a strengthened Brazil, a defiant Russia, a dysfunctional political system, and astronomical debt are all reasons to believe that the boundary of the U.S. sphere of influence will likely end up being the Panama Canal rather than Cape Horn.

In this way, an Argentina valuable enough to be strategic and distant enough to be sovereign will have far greater opportunities as it balances between great powers in a consolidated multipolar world. This geopolitical reality will guarantee Argentina a certain measure of much-needed growth. This is no small matter in a country plagued by narratives of decline, and it is important to emphasize it if we are to make a realistic assessment of the possibilities ahead.

Now, growth and development are two distinct concepts. Economic growth represents a quantitative increase in the size of the economy, while economic development represents a qualitative improvement in it. Growth is a necessary condition for development, but it neither guarantees nor replaces it. It simply creates a historic opportunity by providing the resources required for the necessary strategic investments in social welfare, education, and science.

It is at this point that society as a whole and the political spectrum still have a necessary and complex conversation to hold. The aim would be to build structural hegemonic agreements, key shared points that frame political debate within certain clear limits. Argentine society is still far from reaching this level of consensus, but a realistic assessment of our future possibilities is an important element in structuring that debate.

Over the decades, Argentina has alternated between different models. The geological accumulation of various unfinished national projects is a spectacle that generates widespread frustration. Yet there are collective lessons in this, too. If the first seventy years of our existence were marked by an intermittent civil war (1810-1880) and the bulk of the 20th century by recurring military coups (1930-1983), the last four decades have been characterized by a democratic system that, despite all its limitations, has proven surprisingly resilient. In a country where many of its worst tragedies were self-inflicted, the continuation of the longest period of internal peace in our history is a source of pride and hope.

Personally, my philosophy is that things in life are not good or bad, but tend to be good and bad. And they tend to be good and bad for the very same reasons, which is why life is difficult. One bad thing about Argentina is that it is a country where it is hard to get things done. And one good thing about Argentina is that it is a country where it is hard to get things done. Despite the fluctuations, power is divided among a wide array of social actors: the three branches of the national government, provincial governors, major municipal governments, the Church, the agricultural sector, the financial sector, industrial business leaders, trade unions, tech unicorns, influential communities, the cultural sphere, the media, universities, the intellectual middle class, social movements, football clubs, neighborhood organizations… Thanks to this, power is spread widely enough among enough groups that are sufficiently different from one another to prevent any one sector from accumulating power to the point where it can permanently subordinate the rest.

The result is a remarkably resilient country. Over the years, Argentina has weathered a fierce process of alternation between different political projects with surprising staying power. As long as the democratic order continues and successive governments take office, accumulated historical experience will yield lessons from which society will forge new forms of consensus. Here lies the key issue: our country's survival in the 21st century is virtually guaranteed. Argentina is and will continue to be a country with far more future ahead of it than past behind it. It will be the historical duty of the generations living through this period to prove equal to this historic opportunity.